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cellardoor1116
01 February 2007 @ 03:44 pm
I have yet to see the actual film, but I stumbled upon the debate swirling around this film just today. And when I found a Pentecostal blogger blogging about the subject, I had to join in.

You see, it's one thing to be angry that someone from outside your belief system inaccurately (to your mind) represents your beliefs and behaviours but posits them as truth. I get positively incensed when I see Conservatives painting Liberals as these crazy, irrational and greedy people who don't know what's right and wrong (see, for example, the children's book
"Help Mom! There are liberals under my bed!"). So that, I can understand.

Grady and Ewing are not Pentecostals. But they dare to try to understand them through their children, attending Pentecostal camp. I have not actually seen the film, so I am not going to take a stand as to whether or not it is or is not biased. However, I will take a stand in reading an article about the film, in interview with Ewing and Grady that has been frequently teased, distorted and conveniently edited to meet the needs of the Pentecostal retaliation.

Like I say, I don't know if the film IS biased or not. I would even be willing to guess that it is because it's hard NOT to create a biased documentary. However, if your big complaint is that they decontextualised members of the Pentecostal faith and used extreme examples to illustrate their point... don't then do the same in return.

The following was my response to said blog:

Dear Rich,

I found many of your comments very insightful and interesting. However I would like to note that you yourself are subscribing to the very behaviour you criticise: In one of the articles you reference about “Jesus Camp” and its makers, Grady and Ewing, they do not condemn or even too deeply distort the camp or the faith behind it even according to the camp leader herself. However in your blog, you have edited around their comments in order to depict them as filmmakers who created something extreme out of nothing at all.

Regarding your comments about the lack of conflict within the raw footage and how they then throw in many disparate elements in order to create a better story, if you read the entire article, it actually says is the following:

“I agree with Poland that Papantonio’s role feels a bit forced and unnecessary and could perhaps be edited down before the film is widely distributed. When I asked Grady why he was included, she revealed Papantonio actually “was a late add to the movie; we had been editing for six or seven months before we incorporated him.” She explains that without his scenes, “There was absolutely no conflict. There was no conflict of conscience on any of the children’s part, there was no conflict of conscience on any of the adult’s part. Part of their lifestyle is they don’t have a lot of doubt. They very much believe that their lifestyle and what they’re doing is the one and the only way to live, and they hope that people will join them. So there was something about it that just felt like it wasn’t dynamic enough.” Papantonio’s involvement does allow for at least one interesting moment late in the film, when Fischer calls into Papantonio’s radio program and the two briefly interact in a moment representative of the larger national debate that is sure to ensue when the film becomes available to a larger audience.” (Scott Feinburg, May 2006, emphasis mine)

The comment about a lack of conflict is not regarding conflict within the story arc, nor is it regarding a lack of conflict because of the angelic and peaceful nature of these people; this lack of conflict which Grady astutely points out is one of belief. Because Evangelicals tend not to question The Word and subsequent beliefs, but instead regard it as absolute truth, filming solely amongst members of that insular community allows no conflict of belief that characterises the greater national debate facing our country right now.

Also, Fischer is (apparently) very pleased with the way the film came out. She feels she was given an accurate and balanced portrayal of herself and her mission. Or so says the article.

But if it serves your point better to edit that out and instead insinuate these filmmakers “toss in a conflicted profile of the “Kids on Fire” camp director, Becky Fischer; include a few oddball characters for color and commentary”, so be it. Your editing skills seem to fight fire with fire.
 
 
Current Mood: contemplativecontemplative
Current Music: dull hum of planes flyin overhead,wash of cars,chirpin birds
 
 
cellardoor1116
02 May 2006 @ 05:06 pm


Okay, so a funny thing happened to me yesterday.

Before I begin this story, let me remind you that I live in SCOTLAND now. Scotland. I go to the University of Edinburgh, a large (very international, granted) university, but still one that remains people mostly with Brits. And rightfully so. It is, after all, located in SCOTLAND.

Well yesterday, for the first time in three years, I was assigned an exam room in a building I'd never heard of, and worse yet, when I looked it up on the map, I didn't recognize that part of town. At least not altogether well. I oriented myself as best I could, thinking I had myself sorted and set out, figuring I would find it eventually.

Sure enough, as I neared that end of town, I realized that my mental orientation was only slightly askew, but off just enough to make me unsure of where to go from there.

Luckily, I spotted a girl I recognized from all of my classes. I'd noticed her throughout the semester for a few reasons. She's very pretty, in that very unique way, with bright red curls (totally natural) and a face recalling an early/mid 1980s Molly Ringwald. Also, she's ever so slightly alternative. Not massively, but enough to stand out amidst a room full of studious and (let's face it) often stuffy conservative academics. So I'd been drawn to her, but never had the opportunity to speak to her. Until now. When I needed a point in the right direction.

Well we walked and made small talk. Turns out she's only here on a semester abroad from UC Berkeley. "Oh!" I said "Awesome. Berkeley was the only university I wanted to attend more than Edinburgh, but unfortunately when I realized that, it was too late for the application deadline". But still, I thought this a nice little node of connection.

After the exam, we walked home together, as it turns out we lived in the same direction. I asked if she was actually from California, to which she answered yes. Bay Area? I asked. She said "I'm from San Diego, actually."

To which I, again, said "Oh! Wow! I have a bunch of friends in San Diego. I was just there over New Year. I was staying in... in... oh man, it starts with a C..."

"Carlsbad?" she asked

"That's the one."

She nodded, then after a pause, asked me, somewhat perplexed: "So... how did that happen? How do you have a bunch of friends in San Diego if you live here and your family is from Boston?"

I chuckled and said "well, I worked on this ranch a few years ago. It's in a place called Bonsall? You've probably never heard of it it's a tiny little town..."

But with a wry smile she cut me off and said "Rawhide Ranch?"

To which I, suitably wide eyed and astonished, replied "yeah..."

She laughed and smiled, exclaiming "OH MY GOD! I went there EVERY SUMMER of my childhood!"

We prodeeded to have about a five minute back and forth of "no WAY! NO WAY! No way. No. WAY!"

Her name is Stacey. She stopped going in either '99 or 2000.

Again, I would like to remind you that I live in SCOTLAND. And in a University of over 30,000 people, two people, one ex camper, one ex counselor, who both attended the same tiny little ranch in a tiny little town in East of Nowhere, California managed to find each other.

Sing with me now: "It's a small world after all!..."
 
 
Current Location: somewhere over the rainbow
Current Mood: amusedamused
Current Music: "A Memory of you" by Jocelyn Arem
 
 
cellardoor1116
30 April 2006 @ 09:41 pm
What makes an image inappropriate? (or "Why MySpace sucks")  
Yesterday, I drew a picture.



Pleased with the outcome, I posted this as my primary photo on my MySpace and Friendster profiles...

To my surprise, when I signed back into MySpace not an hour later, I discovered that there was a blank "no photo" icon next to my name. My drawing had been deleted inside of an hour. Without notification. Without good reason.

Between confusion and anger, I started to think. Of course, I think this example set by the administrators over at the MySpace community is but a microcosm that smacks of much larger issues facing our society at large. Such as the over-sexed, under-cultured standard that seems to be taking hold of our youth, firmly and irrevocably, for example. Perhaps that's unfair- it's not just our youth. Our population. In this western (particularly American) culture, which increasingly pushes its members to conform, to consume, to focus primarily on one's own individual universe, while the school systems consistently cut back arts programs in favour of business, what really are we to expect? The value of art and creativity drops by the day, while the caché of material wealth and sexual desirability steadily climbs. Likewise, as our culture marches boldly and unapologetically to the right, the morality of sexuality, sensuality and nakedness is suddenly called into question... drawing spurious, often hypocritical conclusions, it would seem. And to be fair, the figure in my drawing is indeed nude.

At least I'm in good company. Wasn't it Michaelangelo who painted a famous fresco of people ascending to heaven and the church came back and painted strategically placed cloths over all of the men's *shush* pee-pees?

But still, this tickled my intellectual side, begging bigger questions about the nature of what our dear administrators over at MySpace deem "appropriate": why is it okay for individuals to post scantily clad, flirtatious or sexually explicit photos, when artwork depicting the nude female form is deleted? Is it the naked body or the sexual implications of an image that make it inappropriate? Moreover, is a sexually explicit photo in which the subjects are clothed any more appropriate than a sexually neutral drawing depicting a nude body?

So I had a little look around. Apparently, it's acceptable for horny teenagers to give themselves personalised url's that say "fuckkfaceeee" and post seductive photos with tag lines that say "touch it-bring it-babe", as long as they're wearing some semblance of clothing. Even when one photo portrays two girls, one fellating a vegetable planted between the other girl's legs (see "who I want to meet" section), as long as they are both clothed it would seem that this photo is therefore deemed fit for public consumption... but art depicting the nude female form somehow demands censorship.

In fact, there are profiles devoted entirely to media groups that specialize in saucy sexual images , while many individual profiles contain varying degrees of provocative photos, from FHM style vixen shots to simple sultry and arousing where the intent is implied. All are effective indeed.

So what makes my drawing stand out as uncouth? I think the problem here is the implication of nipples. I notice, as I trawl through profiles, that there are very few nipple shots. Plenty of cleavage but very little nipple. There are several photos of women wearing almost nothing, but who cover up their nipples with hands , arms , or who wear strategically placed nipple stickers , clothes or objects. But is my drawing, containing merely an implied shape of a nipple (as they are not clearly deliniated) so much more explicit? Have I somehow crossed the bounds of propriety in a way that these fellow MySpacers have not?

One friend of mine, benefactor of the doubt that she is, suggested perhaps the reason my drawing was deleted could be that they thought it was copyrighted. But if that be the case, I ask: why did they not notify me? Why, as there was no copyright listed on the image anywhere (and, in fact, contained a caption stating my agency in creating it), was that the immediate assumption, and by that token, an assumption that warranted immediate deletion of said image?

Perhaps I'm off base. Perhaps I'm making a case out of something where there is none. Perhaps I'm operating under a misappropriated assumption. Perhaps there is a crucial third variable to which I'm not privvy. But then, I have nothing upon which to base my assumptions as I received neither notice nor explanation of deletion, merely a blank space in my photo section where my drawing once was.

But all is not lost: Friendster let me post it on my profile. As my primary photo no less. You can view it here on my friendster profile .

If you are equally inflamed by this double standard set by MySpace, feel free to climb up on my soap box with me.

If you have any insights, feel free to leave a comment either here or on my MySpace blog .

If you think I'm crazy, well, feel free. You wouldn't be the first.

*DISCLAIMER: if you, or anyone you know, appears in any of the selected links, I would like to make clear that this post is not meant in judgment, nor are these photos the most explicit out there. These are simply the few that stood out (during the brief search I conducted) that enforce my point that this is a double standard I find abhorrent*

MySpace sucks. Vive le Friendster.
Tags: ,
 
 
Current Location: the desk at my window
Current Mood: pensivepensive
Current Music: Adem "Gone Away" and now Sufjan Stevens "John Wayne Gacy Jr"
 
 
cellardoor1116
20 January 2006 @ 02:58 pm
Your Inner Child Is Surprised

You see many things through the eyes of a child.
Meaning, you're rarely cynical or jaded.
You cherish all of the details in life.
Easily fascinated, you enjoy experiencing new things.


I know I've been lame in the blogging universe. I've had loads of things to write about, but been so inundated with work, it just hasn't happened.

Soon, loves, soon. For now...
 
 
Current Mood: calmcalm
Current Music: "Little by Little" Groove Armada
 
 
cellardoor1116
As per the request of miss Lottie, I'm posting my end-of-term discursive essays.  This one was for my "Social Development" class and I apologize that it's rubbish- I haven't even reread it since I finished writing it.  This is literally the first and final draft, but I like it because it's the first essay I've ever written where I had the audacity to cite Bono with derision and discuss the construction of a "bogeyman" (that's "boogie man" to you 'murican polk).  Doesn't make the essay any better.  But, again, it is what it is. So it goes.  It too looks a lot prettier in Word.  There are italics and indentations... it's pretty wild.  Ayep, like I say- here in Edinburgh?  Yeah, we know how to party...

*****

“When all you have is a hammer, the whole world looks like a nail.” -Kaplan
An Examination of the Relevance of this Aphorism to the Modern Development Era

            Between the popularisation of the millennium development goals and celebrity endorsed global political campaigns such as the “Make Poverty History” and “ONE” campaigns, development has become an increasingly trendy staple of political pop culture.  Currently attached to grandiose altruistic notions of redistributing the wealth of nations and eradicating poverty once and for all, as a conceptual catchphrase, ‘development’ holds tremendous social and political caché.  However, the wake of colonialism left many controversial ethical and practical issues surrounding its successor, ‘development’.  Development itself is not so one-dimensional; bearing this complex history as well as a host of highly contentious debates over the validity of its theory and application, development is in fact a truly multi-dimensional concept, complete with both virtues and flaws contributing to its reality.
            Proponents of development boast that, when successful, development allows for the eradication of poverty and other social ills by way of simple and effective strategies that can be applied to many situations.  Conversely, critics of development claim that, for that very reason, development as a concept is fatally flawed; by reducing complex problems and applying simple generic “quick fix” solutions, development is not only ineffective and potentially unsustainable, but also exposes ethnocentric intentions behind the application. Social anthropologists, in particular, remain consistently sceptical of development as a practice because development the very term ‘development’ implies hegemony and patronage, while in practice, it seeks to change cultures, where anthropology attempts to preserve them (Green, 2003:6).
            Thus the ideology, practice, and effects of development are neither overwhelmingly positive (as Bono, and other starry eyed idealists, might lead one to believe) nor entirely negative (as some reputed social scientists, such as Escobar and Sachs insist).  It is, in fact, both, however, much like Kaplan’s aphorism implies, in both ideology and practice, the temptation to reduce and oversimplify problems in favour of prescribing universal remedies makes the concept immediately questionable.  However this need not be the case.  In order to counterbalance essentialism, both practitioners and critics of development alike must look at the multiple facets that shape development discourse, and the factors that contribute to both its successes and failures, then utilise said knowledge to either improve the existing mechanism of development or potentially generate an entire new one.

"Colonialism and Development: Necessary Tools of the Trade?"
            The undeniable connection between colonialism and development causes a great deal of scepticism amongst many, as the intentions behind and methods of development are assigned immediate suspicion and thereby subjected to copious scrutiny. In the wake of World War II, imperialism fell out of favour, forcing many colonial empires to dismantle, and subsequently redistribute their power. It was during this period that Harry Truman gave his inaugural speech, officially stating a desire to expand and improve “underdeveloped” areas.  It follows, according to Escobar (1988 and 1995, as cited by Gardner and Lewis, 1996: 1), that development, as a concept, is therefore “embedded in neo-colonial constructions of the world and is a key ideological tool in global power relations”. Development is not seen as a remedy to colonialism, but instead its replacement.
            Although Truman couched his desires in terms of economic growth and modernity in a concerted effort to divorce his program from colonialism (Gardner and Lewis, 1996: 6; Nustad, 2001: 480), he did not completely exorcise the demons left over from imperial rule.  With but a few words, he set the standard for essentialism that would be both the blessing and the curse of development:  “From that day… the majority of the world’s population were no longer seen as diverse peoples, but were turned into a homogenous mass characterised by their condition as ‘underdeveloped’” (Nustad, 2001: 480).  This is problematic as it sets an immediate precedent of uniformity, both by stripping the so-called ‘underdeveloped’ cultures of their particularity, and thereby also creating a standard for prescribing general remedies.
            Likewise, development is inextricably twinned with the principles of Enlightenment, which themselves overflow with covert ethnocentrism.  With the heavy focus on the gathering knowledge of through rational processes and empirical means, the principles of Enlightenment simultaneously created the polarity between ‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’, ‘backward’ and ‘advanced’, ‘superstitious’ and ‘scientific’ (Gardner and Lewis, 1996: 4).  Current development discourse, although a great deal more reflexive about the overt racism and hegemonic implications of such distinctions, much of the doctrine its predecessor has carried over in subtext, as have some practical applications of imposing ones own cultural priorities and practices upon another.  With the axiom of these guiding principles, both colonialism and development tend to grow myopic when assessing the situation of a society and its needs.  As Gardner and Lewis (ibid: 5) note, comparing the two, colonialism and development, exposes many residual similarities.  Colonial discourse constructed the ‘natives’ as childlike, and the colonisers as rational agents, often expressing this in terms of the relationship between a parent and a minor.  Similarly, in development discourse, the distinction is drawn between the ‘underdeveloped’ South and the ‘developed’ North, couched in moralistic, judgmental overtones and expressed in terms of aid trusteeship.  The motivation behind colonial rule was principally that of economic gain, while a balance of altruistic intentions and political, economic benefits fuels the motivation for development.  Crucially, colonial rule introduced European cultural elements into the colonised society, such as European education systems, Christianity, as well as political bureaucratic structures, with the express purpose of changing the society at hand.  Development also aims to change the ‘underdeveloped’ society, but only insofar as to rectify any problems proving damaging to the good of the society.  Participatory method is the current raison d’être, whereby members of the society articulate their needs to the developers instead of vice versa, however some would argue that this is more or less a mere formality.
            As development has increasingly become a reified professionalized discourse in its own right, it has become the proverbial hammer, narrowly bounded and regimented in its pursuit of the nail.  Escobar explains that development has, itself, transformed into ‘a discourse: a particular mode of thinking and a source of practice designed to instil in ‘underdeveloped’ countries the desire to strive towards industrial and economic growth” (1988 and 1995, as cited by Gardner and Lewis, 1996:6).  The commodification of aid provides a particularly acute example of this redirection of sustained colonial relations; multiple organizations have formed to go about the business of aid, in which ‘development’ is likened to a ‘product’ (Gardner and Lewis, 1996: 9).  Likewise, donors tend to give most to their former colonies, but also effectively compete with one another in an effort to provide aid because of both the political and economic benefits that accompany assisting impoverished nations (ibid: 10).  It is easy to become cynical about this commodification of aid, however, it is important to recognise that the practice is not entirely exploitative, as evidenced by the fact that most aid remains aimed at the neediest, not the biggest potential market (ibid).  This provides a prime example of the consistent theme of good, however misguided, intentions in development practice.
            It is crucial to distinguish between intentions and results, notes by Ferguson (1990, as cited by Gardner and Lewis, 1996:11), because the two are not necessarily categorically similar.  “Whatever interests may be at work and whatever [aid projects] may think they are doing, they can only operate through a complex set of social and cultural structures so deeply embedded and so ill-perceived that the outcome may be only a baroque and unrecognisable transformation of the original intention.”  Ferguson thus posits that the unfavourable outcomes development do not necessarily represent a conscious attempt to sustain neo-colonial relationships.  As a result, one should not bother wasting his or her time assigning a value judgment to the practice of development and the distribution of aid, but rather, one must acknowledge its existence and look at what it does and doesn’t do well, and thereby seek ways to improve upon it (ibid; also in Nustad, 2001: 481).  However, whilst, on these grounds, development may claim superiority over the blatant racism inherent to the colonial agenda, it still retains a great deal of imperial characteristics, even if such motives are not necessarily overt.  Whilst both development practitioners and scholars continue to wrestle against this reality by introducing participatory methods to better me the needs of those being ‘developed’, no matter how well the intentions are in origin and are subsequently enacted, the fact remains that it is an external imposition of one’s cultural priorities upon another and must therefore remain constantly reflexive in order not to cross the bounds of hegemony. 

"Modernisation: The Only Useful Tool?"
            Because of the principles of Enlightenment form the base of development discourse, the concept of ‘development’ and the concept of ‘modernisation’ thus forge an almost inextricable relationship.  The heart of development is embedded in the concept of social ‘betterment’ via economic growth, and likewise, social betterment is very often conflated with the quest for modernity via industrialisation and urbanisation.  In the inaugural speech which officially introduced the term development (as opposed to colonialism), Truman specifically stated that his “bold new programme” would be aimed at “making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (as cited in Gardner and Lewis, 1996: 6).  This conflation of technological advancement, urbanisation and industrialisation with development is deeply problematic, as it does not take into account the different cultures and the relativity of so-called ‘betterment’.  As Gardner and Lewis (1996: 14) note, this “assumption that all change inevitably follows the Western model is both breathtakingly ethnocentric and empirically incorrect”.  Not all societies benefit from industrialisation and modernisation in the same way, and it can in fact prove detrimental to some.
            As Sachs (1989, as cited by Pieterse, 2000: 177) explains, low activity in the market economy does not necessarily equate to deprivation, nor does economic growth necessarily equate to enhanced standards of living.  “As societies in the affluent North demonstrate, the increased use of highly sophisticated technology or a fast growing GNP does not necessarily eradicate poverty, illiteracy or homelessness, although it may well alter the ways in which these ills are experienced” (Gardner and Lewis, 1996: 7).  The unflattering reality of imposing industrialisation and technological advancement strategies on a culture with which it is not conducive is that modernisation ma not alleviate the problems facing society, but in fact could potentially exacerbate them by widening the poverty gap.
            Pieterse (200:177) warns, however, that one should not assume, in the other extreme, that low market participation equates to high social participation.  To do so, one runs the risk of both homogenizing all ‘underdeveloped’ nations under a single romantic notion that is both debatable and potentially misleading.  Generalising the “mass poor” (Gardner and Lewis, 1996: 15) and subsequently prescribing modernity as a remedy reflects Kaplan’s aphorism:  when all one knows is a market economy industry and a certain technological standard, the whole world looks like a homogenously ‘primitive’ and impoverished.  One must instead reflect upon the reality of the individual circumstances facing a culture and assess accordingly.  When too rigidly fixed upon a particular mode of thought, in relation to the conceptualising and subsequent solving of a problem that is inherently complex, it becomes easy to ignore other tools, other solutions, and also other arising problems.
            The cycles of dependence, which arise out of the fundamentally ethnocentric imposition of modernisation, provide a problematic scenario.  Generally, development discourse, modernisation theory in particular, operates under the assumption that all societies are on a more or less linear path heading for the same destination (Ferguson, 1997: 154).  However, this is misleading at best; just because a system works for one culture, it does not necessarily mean it will work for all, and in fact, it can make the situation significantly worse.  Such is the basis for the concept of sustainability:  if a practice is artificially appointed, but does not suit the culture upon which it has been imposed, the burden can lead to friction, even violent conflict, as well as misappropriation of funding and irresponsible use of resources, which could then lead to regression rather than progression (Thin, 2002: 39). Proving that even the seemingly straightforward relationship of a hammer and a nail can in fact be much more complicated, and not work the way one anticipated at all.

"Post-Development: Critically Examining the Tools and the Means of Employment"
            Focused around claims of neo-colonialism and critiques of the aforementioned assumption of universal linear destination for all societies, post-development discourse cites specific examples of development failure with the purpose of leaving little hope for the future of development theory and practice.  Post-development unforgivingly brands all development projects as operative under neo-colonial intentions and accuses them of subsequently executing questionable projects with these ulterior motives in mind that are doomed to fail (Pieterse, 2000; Nustad, 2001; Ferguson, 1997).  However, this approach focuses too heavily on the actions of the practitioners and denudes those being developed of their agency.  “By leaving out or simplifying agency [post-development critics] portray development as both more unified and more powerful than it is…the spread of hegemonic discourses such as development is always played out in local encounters and through human agency” (Nustad, 2001: 486).  Treating people of an ‘underdeveloped’ culture as if they are merely passive hirelings proves both dehumanising to the people involved and fundamentally misleading for future development endeavours.  To achieve a more accurate picture, one must analyse the degrading systems in place, however, must also recognise the ways in which individuals and collective societies strategise, maximise and resist the structures of development that are imposed upon them, while also looking at case studies of embracing local cultures embracing a development project with much success (Gardner and Lewis, 1996: 18). 
            This marks one primary critique of Post-Development rhetoric: that post-development makes little or no attempt to represent any social improvement makes the argument shallow and not altogether trustworthy.  Consistently offering only case studies of failure and ignoring successes (which are fact, and thus part of the reality of modern development) only serves to construct an equivocal villain, a development bogeyman, of sorts.  Neil Thin (2002: 37) explains that this largely stems from the fact that the failures are simply much more obvious than the successes.  “Social fragmentation, however, tens to manifest itself in sudden ruptures and pathological behaviour and is therefore much more readily identified than the gradual onset of social progress”.  The source of pessimism is simply more accessible than the source of optimism (ibid; see also Pieterse, 2000: 184).  One must look deeper at the whole picture in order to accurately assess both success and failure in the appropriate context.  Thin (ibid: 46) further points out that many so-called failures are often the result of either poorly articulated goals or goals that are so broad and relative that they are fundamentally untenable.  “Disappointment refers primarily to frustrated aspirations and not to whether or not progress has occurred… Liberty, prosperity, education, and justice are all abstractions, which means that progress under these criteria is always going to be debatable… the default appears to be ‘if in doubt, assume social degeneration’”. 
            Ironically, in creating such a vehement, and sometimes dubious, critique of development, post-development itself employs the very techniques it so ardently critiques: equivocation, essentialism, and a hegemonic designation of homogeneity.  As Pieterse (2000:183) illustrates “Escobar plays games of rhetoric: in referring to development as ‘Development’ and thus suggesting its homogeneity and consistency, he essentialises ‘development’… Apparently this kind of essentialising of ‘development’ is necessary in order to arrive at the radical repudiation of development, and without this anti-development pathos, the post-development perspective loses its foundation”.  So, in effect, Escobar does to development in his critiques what he is critiquing ‘Development’ for doing in practice: reducing the whole to a single homogenous assumption, and thereby prescribing his discontent writ large.
            Similarly, Thin (2002: 36) notes that little to no attempt has been made to find out how the poor themselves experience poverty and social progress which is itself represents a somewhat hegemonic mindset, as one assumes he or she can speak for the experience of the poor better than the poor can speak for themselves.   Thus in this case, the proverbial hammer of Kaplan’s aphorism becomes manifest in the dogmatic, half blind critiques of Escobar and Sachs, and the nail becomes the prescription of failure in development theory and practice.  This approach to enquiry creates something of a self-fulfilling prophecy: if one looks for failures, one will inevitably find them aplenty, but they will not necessarily be representative, so are they a valid basis for critique?  Simply stopping at critique achieves nothing and only reproduces that which one is critiquing in the first place.

"Looking Beyond the Status Quo: Reinventing Tools and Exploring Them Anew"
            Having established that development is both a successful and flawed concept in application and in theory, the daunting task remains of tackling the question “What now?”  In an attempt to democratise the development process, the current fashion in development discourse and practice is that of participatory methodology.  However, Nustad, among others, argues that participatory methods are a mere tokenistic formality, and in fact, democracy only slows down the process and inhibits the effective execution of the project.  “Although newer versions of development argue against a top-down approach to development…a development process is always initiated with a specific goal in mind and, although developers portray themselves as ‘facilitators’, they still know where the process ought to be heading’ (2001: 481).  He goes on to also explain that participatory methods can prove inhibitive, as “research has shown how the restrictions imposed on the developers’ conception of their task sometimes undermines the whole intervention” (2001: 488).  Should development practitioners thus be given more prescriptive freedom?  This remains a tenuous issue, as there is the ever-present fear of inadequately manoeuvring the line between beneficiary aid and blind hegemonic imposition.  I think it safe to say that very few people would argue that coming full circle with a return to the colonial roots is the healthiest option for the progression of development.
            In response to the post-development critiques, there have arisen a slew of ‘alternative development’ schemes.  However, most post-development theorists derisively dismiss ‘alternative development’ as the proverbial ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’, maintaining the essence of development disguised by a modified name and given a slightly different angle of approach.  But whether correct or not, critics of post-development cite the failure of theorists, in light of their overwhelmingly negative critique of development, to provide any alternative possibilities.  Nustad (2001: 488), however, defends this stance, noting that to offer alternatives indicates a belief that “the apparatus now in place has the capacity to deliver a solution”, which, he goes on to say, there are significant reasons to doubt to be the case.  Whilst it is not necessarily wise to brand all development as being fatally flawed, in order to best find ways to improve upon the existing system, it is important to recognize the principle weaknesses in both theoretical and practical approaches to poverty and its eradication. 
            When prescribing practical solutions to broad interrelated social problems, myopia is an easy condition to develop.  However, becoming fixated on a single means toward a given end can potentially blind one to other potential solutions that may in fact exceed the current one.  As development faces a crossroads, of sorts, between progress and decline, perhaps it is time to turn toward new approaches to new solutions altogether. “The way forward for development studies, I believe, is to examine how development interventions are transformed, reformulated, adopted, or resisted in local encounters… there is an important task ahead of reconstituting poverty within the political domain: namely, examining how poverty is produced, and the relationship between processes that produce wealth and poverty” (Nustad, 2001: 485 and 488).  Instead of treating poverty as the principle problem to remedy, recognising that it is generally the symptom of much larger socio-structural inequalities provides greater scope for long-term development success.  Thus, one must either find new relationships between the proverbial hammer and nail, or perhaps, throw them out altogether in favour of something new, something unknown.  Something fundamentally different.


References:
Ferguson, J. (1997), ‘Anthropology and its evil twin: “Development” in the Constitution of a Discipline’.  In F. Cooper and R. Packard [eds], International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge.  Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gardner, K and D. Lewis (1996), Anthropology, Development and the Post-Modern Challenge.  London: Pluto.

Green, M. (2003), ‘International Development, Social Analysis, and Anthropology? Applying Anthropology In and To Development’. Paper at Workshop on Applications of Anthropology: Loughborough.  Available Online: http://www.loboro.ac.uk/departments/ss/applicationsofanthropology/greenpaper.htm

Pieterse, J.N. (2000), ‘After Post-Development’. Third World Quarterly, 21(2): 175-191.

Nustad, K.G. (2001),‘Development: the Devil We Know?’, Third World Quarterly, 22(4): 479-489.

Thin, N. (2002), Social Progress and Sustainable Development. London:IT Publications.

 
 
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cellardoor1116
15 December 2005 @ 01:13 am
As per the request of miss Lottie, I'm posting my end-of-term discursive essays. This one was for my "War and Culture" class and I apologize that it's rubbish. But, it is what it is. It looks a lot prettier in Word. There are italics and indentations... it's pretty wild. We know how to live it up here in Edinburgh.
*****

“An understanding of violence is beyond the limits of anthropological analysis”
Discuss.

    Although the presence of violence and violent situations in an ethnographic context is not new to anthropological enquiry, violence itself is not traditionally confronted as the subject under scrutiny.  However, in recent years, an increasing number of anthropologists seek volatile situations for the express purpose of making violence itself the focal point of their ethnographic analysis.  Because violence blends together a number of social factors, ranging from the physical and/or psychological impact of individual experiences to broad themes such as the enactment of power and inequality, the topic of violence provides fertile ground for ethnographic insight into a given culture. But can anthropology analytically explore violence and its context with accuracy and sensitivity, without essentialising the circumstances by default?  Does the very volatile and emotionally partisan nature of violence and conflict not fundamentally contradict the foundational principles of anthropological analysis: objectivity and disengaged observation?
    Anthropology has a great deal of scope for potentially tackling an ethnography of violence.  The vehicle of ethnography is a flexible too for analysis, allowing a polyphony of voices and range of perspectives to give a more complete account of the experience of violence and its impact on the given culture.  Utilising participant observation to offer first hand access to the victims and/or perpetrators of violence and relay their accounts in a personal way provides in-depth cultural background. However, anthropology requires several critical factors for success, namely access to the individuals in question.  Likewise, the emphasis of objectivity and cultural relativity prove potentially limiting as one must tone down the emotion of violence in order to achieve a non-partisan account, and in doing so, effectively removes the essence of the experience of violence.  Thus, broad understandings of the social and structural causes, consequences, and patterns of violence, as well as descriptive accounts of the impact of violence are well within the bounds of anthropological analysis. However, the experience of violence remains impossible to capture analytically.  I would argue that anthropology, of all the social sciences, with its emphasis on participant observation and attempts at understanding culture from the most holistic standpoint possible makes it a prime candidate for best representing the true experience, but, in order for this to be plausibly attainable within the bounds of anthropological analysis, there must be a rethinking, and subsequent restructuring, of the approach to anthropology and ethnography in violent situations.  If the anthropologist insists upon objective distance within a violent situation and thus remains morally, politically, and ethically disengaged, a true understanding of violence is impossible to achieve.  

"Cultural Relativism:  The Tepid Relationship of Anthropology to Violence"
        Historically, the discipline of anthropology boasts a controversial connection to violence.  This contentious relationship is particularly well documented in the debates over both female infibulation in some parts of Africa and headhunting in the Philippines. Much to the discomfort of most anthropologists, the genesis of anthropology as a discipline stems directly from the colonial era, during which many European societies conquered various cultures throughout the world and subsequently attempted to assimilate said culture to the European way of life.  As a result, in an attempt to divorce itself form these imperialistic roots, anthropological doctrine tends to stand firmly on the opposite end of the spectrum, guided by the principle tenet of cultural relativism, the Boasian precept ascertaining that no society is better or worse than any other, all are simply different, but equally valid. Ardently attempting to remain as non-invasive as possible, and instead offer only objective analysis sans judgment, anthropologists studying cultures in which violent traditions and practices prevail tend to either justify the practices as artefacts of cultural difference, not to be judged or impeded upon, or avoid direct engagement with the subject altogether (Farmer, 1994:287). Such a noncommittal stance within such an emotionally charged circumstance forces anthropology to perennially walk on proverbial eggshells when approaching fieldwork in violent situations.
        But is cultural relativism an appropriate gauge of a violent situation?  Is suffering relative?  Or are certain human rights universal and indisputable?  As Farmer (1994: 287) asks, “…is every culture a law unto itself and a law unto nothing other than itself?”  To dismiss practices of violence as culturally specific institutions to be respected, regardless of one’s own moral predisposition against them (and even dismissing such a disposition as ethnocentric), is both analytically limiting and ethically problematic. Farmer further explains: “cultural difference is one of several forms of essentialism used to explain away assaults on dignity and suffering in general”.  Thus, in order to achieve any kind of understanding of violence, the anthropologist must take conscious steps to ‘unlearn’ these ingrained principles, and attempt to approach the study of violence with a restructured mentality.

"Abstraction and Concentration:  Representing Structures versus Experiences of Violence"
        Because of the many variant causes and manifestations of violence, enacted either by an individual or a group of individuals whom potentially occupy any one of a wide range of social roles, analyzing violence is likewise inexact. Such a multiplicity of interrelated contributing factors makes an analysis of violence prone to oversimplification, but by utilising ethnography to show the many dimensions of the culture that contribute to the violence and its effect, anthropology offers a tremendous capacity to illustrate the multifaceted nature of violence. In their article ‘Violence and Demoralization in the New World Order’, Robert Desjarlais and Arthur Kleinman (1994: 9) posit that anthropological enquiries into violence and violent situations typically take one of two distinct (and yet necessarily interwoven) approaches: the ‘anthropology of the state’ and the ‘anthropology of the individual’.  ‘Anthropology of the state’ tends to look at the social forces and patterns that create and sustain violence, usually with especial focus on collective violence, systematically enacted either by an oppressive regime or in a war/combat/conflict situation, while the ‘anthropology of the individual’ tends to look at the physical and psychological effects of violence, focusing on the people who are, themselves, experiencing it.  This ability to isolate patterns and recognize the broad social dimensions of a culture that make it unique, while also employing a “hands on” participant approach to get to know the actors and their experiences in a real and personal way creates fertile ground for anthropological enquiry to assess the multiplicity of nuance that truly embodies/represents the experience of violence.  
        However, anthropological accounts and subsequent analyses of violence generally tend either to lean too heavily on more sociological account of the overarching structures and patterns of violence or to over emphasise purely experiential accounts. While both are valuable for an analytical dissection violence, balance must be struck between the two.
“We can and should develop new theoretical models to understand what is at stake in the social experience of violence and demoralization…  Questions on the social construction and destruction of meaning, moralities and political orders are crucial to these considerations.  To begin to develop answers to these questions, we need to construct an object of research enquiry that opens an intermediary space between collective and individual axes of experience, a space where the social body and the physical body intersect” (Desjarlais and Kleinman,  1994: 11).
Because of the tendency to either take a macro focused look at the broad social patterns and structures of state instituted violence or a micro focused look at the physical and emotional impact of violence on the individual, the anthropologist runs the risk of misrepresenting violence, and in the process, possibly either desensitizing or eroticizing it. Whether the analysis is too broadly theoretical or too specifically emotional, the imbalance renders the ethnographic analysis ineffective.  By segregating these two factors, this approach potentially ignores the complementary symbiosis of the state and the individual in shaping the holistic effect of violence (Desjarlais and Kleinman,  1994: 11). An understanding of both of these factors is therefore crucial to a true analysis and understanding of violence.
        An analysis that is overly objective lacks the distinguishing characteristic of violence- that of emotional and or physical pain.  By the same token, however,  an account that is too steeped in emotion likewise loses analytical credibility and depth, while also running the risk of crossing into the bounds of exploitation as opposed to representation.  As Brauman 1993: 158) explains, it is the duty of the individual documenting suffering to “… demonstrate that what they are doing is founded on principles more solidly based, and hence more demanding, that the appeals to the emotions which are so tempting to exploit”. While it is important to record the emotion of suffering, one must not then ignore the effect of social patterns and structures. Thus, anthropologists face the difficult task of balancing an objective analysis of the social patterns of violence and the societal factors that sustain violence and violent situations, with the visceral accounts of individual experiences of said violence and its consequences.  
        However, even in adequately describing the violence one witnesses directly or by means of an informant’s account, this cannot capture the essence or experience of violence. .   “Each person in a collectivity assimilates the necessarily elliptical language of information into the set of feelings, impressions and experiences which make up his or her specific context” (Brauman, 1993: 152).   Personal and cultural relativity limits the potential for truly understanding the experience of violence, not simply because an objective analysis from an outside source may omit the visceral experience of emotional and physical pain, but also because even when one experiences empathy, he/she does not experience what the victim experiences but instead fabricates an impression of the experience based on various own cultural understandings, expectations and/or assumptions.  The interpretation of the violence is thus as culturally relative as the violence itself.  

"Waiting and Watching: Finding the Role of the Anthropologist in Violent Situations"
        One of the most limiting and problematic aspects of an anthropological enquiry into violence is that the role occupied by an anthropologist within the context of a violent conflict remains indistinct at best.  Typically, there exist three primary roles within a violent situation: the perpetrator, who orchestrates and enacts said violence, the victim, who suffers from the act, circumstance or condition of violence, and (when relevant) the witness, who bears testimony to a firsthand account of having seen, heard, or experience the violence (Dictionary.com).  The classic role enacted by an anthropologist as an objective participant observer does not fit into any of these categories, thus obscuring his or her purpose in a violent ethnographic situation. This places the anthropologist at a disadvantage to the comprehensive understanding of complexities of the violent situation; because the anthropologist is neither perpetrator nor victim, but, at the same time, also actively shies away from being an engaged witness, there is an inherent liminality in the anthropological role, which, in turn, limits his or her understanding of the violence in question.
Scheper-Hughes (1995: 414) expresses that, in the traditional role of anthropologist as spectator, the difficulty of engaging in the passive act of waiting is the lack of control one has, both over his/her surroundings, but also, as a result, over his/her ethnography itself.  “[Waiting] is marked by contingency… and all the anxiety [and all the… powerlessness, helplessness, vulnerability, and infantile rage] that comes with the experience of contingency.  [Waiting] is a passive activity.  One can never actively seek the object of waiting… ultimately its arrival or nonarrival is beyond our control” (Crapanzano, 1984: 44, as cited by Scheper-Hughes, 1995: 414, abridgment mine).  Is this frustrated impotence the ultimate fate of any attempted anthropological analysis of violence? As a participant observer, an anthropologist could potentially utilise his/her unique position to engage with the situation as witness.                     However, ‘witness’ connotes an actively partisan role with which anthropologists are typically uncomfortable, The pervading mentality continues that ethnography is not meant to be a testimonial to one side, but an objective record of a culture, gleaned from observation and examination at an academic distance.  However, if the anthropologist continues to approach an ethnography of violence in this classically conservative manner that typifies anthropological enquiry, any attempt to understand and analyse violence will be necessarily limited.
        Likewise, should an anthropologist choose to study a violent subject, he/she must also confront and traverse the very fine, and often blurred, line between participant observation and categorical initiation. In such an emotionally partisan situation as a violent conflict, the anthropologist runs the risk of becoming either politically, emotionally and/or physically involved in the conflict, or, in the other extreme, an entirely detached and uninvolved outside observer.  This becomes tricky on both practical and philosophical levels:  it is both a moral crisis and a logistical question of access- will the subjects continue to cooperate? Access becomes a potentially problematic point of issue; if one does not have proper access to the motives, thoughts, and experiences of those instigating and incurring the violence, the anthropologist will never be able to truly analyze violence.  If the anthropologist does not become involved, this detachment potentially closes him/her off from his subjects..  “What sort of dialogue can a fieldworker establish with groups who practice or support such violence?  What kind of ‘authenticity’ can a writer stage for such an encounter? … No explanation of the moral and political paradox will provide a definitive answer to the question ‘but how can that be?’ of violence and death” (Zulaika, 1995: 418).
        This obscuring of purpose and lack of clarity with regard to the anthropological role complicates his or her understanding and analysis both practically and emotionally.  Practically speaking, access to informants can become something of a problem, as informants may no longer want to cooperate with someone who does not take one side or another (Zulaika, 1995:417; Scheper-Hughes, 11995: 410). Reduced access to informants has major implications for research. It makes the gathering of information and evidence significantly more difficult. In his fieldwork amongst the ETA, a group of Basque separatists, Joseba Zulaika (1995: 417) provides a telling example of the practical implications of reduced access to the practitioners of violence.  Though initially enthusiastic over Zulaika’s keen interest in both their cause and their actions, their enthusiasm dulled in light of Zulaika’s insistence that his intentions were academically rather than ideologically motivated. The group began to grow distant, acting uncomfortable and occasionally suspicious, finally making clear that they didn’t really want him there.  The emotional effect of this liminal role can cause the anthropologist either to take distance from the emotional experience of the violence he or she is studying or feel empathy, as well as anguish and frustration over his or her impotence.  All of this potentially obscures any understanding of the experience itself (Scheper-Hughes, 1995). Zulaika (1995: 418) similarly describes this frustration caused the indistinct and fundamentally liminal role in his fieldwork amongst the ETA, recounting the situation as being a “disturbingly embarrassing… ironic predicament…” of being “a specialist who knew nothing special about the violence”.  Recognizing that the research that academics hold in such esteem has little practical caché or real application puts the anthropological objectives of recording a culture and the outcome of descriptive ethnography into alarming perspective. At times, such a disillusioning recognition of the contrast between the immediate fact of extreme suffering and the indulgently prolonged collection of ethnographic data renders this kind of intellectual pursuit seemingly obsolete or irrelevant.
         On the other hand, these so-called shortcomings, objectivity and relativism, facing an anthropological pursuit of understanding violence have, at times, actually has proved a useful tool in facilitating a dialogue between the opponent parties of the violent conflict.  This objective observation and analysis can potentially create a forum for both opponent sides to recognize and discuss the situation without vilifying one another (Zulaika, 1995: 417). In the case of Zulaika (ibid), facilitating a town meeting in which he expounded (to much derision) the information thus far gathered in his ethnographic enquiry to the members of both sides of the conflict, this opened a dialogue between the two sides.  Whilst one could argue this is a quintessential example of why any attempt at understanding violence from an anthropological analytical point of view is a farce, at the same time this example proves how, at least, the analysis serves a purpose if nothing else.   It’s easy to reduce perpetrators of violence to simply being ‘violent’ or ‘bad’ people, when in fact, the actions of the perpetrators can be as circumstantial as the violence itself.  While at times, this seems a bit pointless when in a very real way, people are suffering, even dying (See Scheper-Hughes p 415-16 and Zulaika p 419), anthropological analysis can aid in bringing these issues to the fore.

"Mediating Subjectivity and Objectivity"
        The paradox of attempting to understand violence in any kind of an analytical or objective way is that in attempting to analyze violence, one is in pursuit of knowledge and the fundamental defining characteristics of knowledge are reason and rationality, while conversely, the fundamental defining characteristics of violence are passion and irrationality. Therefore, academic understanding of violence is limited as the component parts under analysis are in diametric opposition.  “The goal of knowledge is only more knowledge, and reason becomes its most compelling argument, whereas the kind of puzzlement that forces ultimate questions about the paradoxes of violence demands movement beyond reason” (Zulaika, 1995; Scheper-Hughes, 1995: 415). Thus because an academic explanation is bounded by rationality, reason and objective distance, such an analysis cannot truly grasp the fundamental essence of violence and the multiplicity of its effects.
        Therefore in order to understand violence and appropriately represent its actors, Scheper-Hughes (1995: 416) suggests that it is, in fact, the moral responsibility of the anthropologist to politically engage with the subject, and to not do so is in fact unethical, even if this engagement is indirect (i.e. via the end product ethnography).  As anthropology is evolving , the post-colonial backlash becomes circumstantially irrelevant and potentially unproductive, even counterproductive.  Such conservatism does not serve the good of the culture at hand and hinders the development of anthropology as a discipline.  (see Scheper-Hughes p 418-419) “Anthropologists as witnesses are accountable for what they see and what they fail to see, how they act and how they fail to act in critical situations… the answer to the critique of anthropology is not a retreat from ethnography but rather an ethnography that is personally engaged and politically committed” (Scheper-Hughes, 1995: 418).   Although the knee-jerk discomfort to such an involvement stems largely from a reflexive recognition of the colonial roots of anthropology, and as it follows, a digression from them, there remains a crucial question to be asked: is not the absence of intervention in a conflict equally destructive of native lands and peoples, the difference merely being that we are allowing them to destroy themselves instead of us destroying them?  Allowing destruction of a culture from its own is no better than colonists from an outside nation coming in and doing the same (ibid).                          However, in taking such an approach toward representations and analyses of violence, it remains important that the anthropologist be wary, as a morally committed agent, not to become biased and thereby potentially blinded.  He or she must thus strike a balance between this subjective engagement and an objective analysis.
        Likewise, committing to moral and/or political engagement within a violent situation can be potentially dangerous.  As Scheper-Hughes (1995: 415) notes, “non-involvement has its virtues”. She cites the case of David Webster, an anthropologist who, when doing his fieldwork in South Africa, was murdered after taking an actively engaged and morally committed role in the political struggle against apartheid.    Ironically, the subsequent fear that then became prevalent amongst the academic community was most likely the most authentic experience of violence they could have, allowing an understanding in any real or visceral way.  However, whether or not such an experience translates to any kind of analysis is not necessarily a given, for such a vantage point is fraught with bias and subjectivity which discourages objective academic dissection. At the same time such a situation is still not an entirely authentic experience (as compared to that of the victims) because the anthropologist can always leave, while for victims, no exit is possible.

        Thus, as anthropologists increasingly seek out violent conflicts as the subjects of ethnographic enquiry, anthropology as a discipline faces something of a crossroads, by requiring it to question its role, methodology,  and all of the assumptions it has so long taken for granted.  In order to tackle an ethnography of violence, essentially, one must ask crucial questions both of the anthropologist as an individual as well as of the practice of anthropology as a discipline: Is the anthropologist (at present, when not politically or morally engaged with subjects) a passive, impotent spectator or, worse, by not exposing these issues, not only misunderstanding the violence but also actively contributing to its continuation?  As the subjects of ethnography evolve and expand, so too must the discipline of anthropology evolve with it.

References:

Brauman, R. (1993), ‘When Suffering Makes a Good Story’. In Francois Jean (ed), Life, Death and Aid: The Medicins Sans Frontieres Report on World Crisis Intervention, London: Routledge.

Desjarlais, R, and A. Kleinman (1994), ‘Violence and Demoralization in the New World Disorder’, Anthropology Today 10(5): 9-12.

Dictionary.com (2005), Lexico Publishing Group LLC.  Available online: http://dictionary.reference.com

Farmer, P. 1996. ‘On Suffering and Structural Violence: a View from Below’, Dædalus 125(1): 261-283. Also available in N. Scheper-Hughes and P. Bourgois. 2004. Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology. Malden: Blackwell.

Scheper-Hughes, N. (1995) ‘The Primacy of the Ethical: Propositions for a Militant Anthropology’, Current Anthropology 36(3): 409-440.

Zulaika, J. (1995). ‘The Anthropologist as Terrorist’, in C. Nordstrom and A. Robben (eds.), Fieldwork Under Fire. Berkeley: University of California Press. Also available in N. Schepper-Hughes and P. Bourgois. 2004. Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology. Malden: Blackwell.


 
 
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cellardoor1116
Sam wrote me a testimonial on friendster and then decided he didn't like it well enough because it was "too convoluted", so thus deleted it. I just wanted to save it for myself here, because I liked it... plus it taught me something new!

"Libby is like the luminiferous aether, phlogiston and alchemical quicksilver; like ley lines, the odic force and lamarckian evolution. She is not part of everyone's model of the world, but to those whom she graces with her friendship, the world is a more magical place."

Sam's explanation (for those of us not learnèd enough to know what all of those things were):

"the aether, or "cosmic medium" was the stuff that filled the vaccuum the idea is that vaccuums don't make sense, and that the idea of nothing has no place in physics in short, it was the untouchable goop that allowed the transmission of light through space

phlogiston was an early explanation for thermodynamical chemistry that was all about knots of matter

alchemical quicksilver, or the philosopher's stone, was a substance meant to grant eternal life

ley lines are supposedly the invisible lines of geographic force that control the flow of mana, magyk, chi, etc

odic force is was a concept that was meant to explain consciousness by allowing for a new "sentient" form of energy that life itself created

lamarckian evolution was the idea that changes in the body of an animal would be passed on to further offspring, so that by having to constantly stretch their necks to reach the brances, the babies of early giraffes had long necks as well. the problem with this theory is that more loosely interpreted if you were to superglue a fork to a tiger its children should also have forks

they're all explanations for the real world that were magical, filled with shiny brass gears and glass globes and blue sparks of electricity. and if they do not describe our world, then they describe a more magical one"
 
 
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cellardoor1116
15 October 2005 @ 12:39 pm
You know, I have a bone to pick with you, Scooter Libby.

"Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney's chief of staff, has been center stage for every one of the administration's national security scandals – the Iraq intelligence debacle, secret meetings about Halliburton contracts in Iraq, and the leaking of a CIA's agent's identity to the press – and doubtless others we have not heard of yet.

Such a role is not unusual for Libby, who has more titles in the Bush White House than can fit on a business card. Essentially Libby is Dick Cheney's Dick Cheney – an odd combination of H.R Haldeman and Harry Hopkins, seemingly managing every detail of the vice president's professional life.

For the past three years, that has meant scooting from scandal to scandal." (excerpt from the Center for American Progress website,article 'Who is Scooter Libby?' by John Lyman, July 8,2005)

Not only have you committed effective treason, been engaged in a clandestine corporate greed scandal, and aided the process that led our country into an unjustified war, causing the deaths of many Americans and Iraqis alike, but quite frankly, you have given the thus far relatively untarnished name of Libby very, very, very bad press.

As a Libby, I am apalled. And I don't appreciate reading, daily, "Libby did this.... Libby did that.... inquiries into Libby reveal...." It's burdening me with some by-proxy sense of possessive guilt! And that's just not fair.

Irv Lewis, "Scooter", the Libby's of the world judge and ostracize you, for shame!
Tags:
 
 
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cellardoor1116
05 October 2005 @ 09:20 am
Fact: I have been dicked around a lot over the last two plus years.

I affectionately call these my "misadventures in dating" or my "mencounters of the bad kind", and I always find a way to turn them into a tickling anecdote, because I do firmly believe that laughter is the best way to get through life. But the only problem with laughter is that it masques- purposefully or no- the actual scars forming as a result of those experiences I am now laughing and rolling my eyes over.

Fact: I don't deal well with ambiguity and mixed signals.

... and I know this of myself. This has always been the case. I need to know where I stand with someone, otherwise, that's when I begin to grow insecure and come unglued. As long as I know where I stand, I'm totally 100% chill, together and easy to get on with because I have faith, trust, and confidence. It's just those damn mind games and mixed signals that throw me off kilter and make me freak out.

But for the first time, I can feel those same insecurities creeping into play without reason. At the moment, I'm in the "getting to know you" phase with a boy I fancy. Now, it's been perfectly lovely. Two "dates" where we talked and laughed for hours. Good body language, good chemistry. Then in between, we've been texting each other loads- some flirty, some practical, some silly, some mundane- but all nice. So I'm fairly certain of where I stand with him, and it's right about the same place he stands with me... having a nice time getting to know each other, and liking what we get to know more and more.

Now, I don't know what's going to come of this, nor do I have any need to define it at the moment. I have no desire to push it along or make it something it might not be. But for the first time in my life, I can feel those little niggles of insecurity and self doubt creeping into my mind even though I am fairly sure of where I stand. And that's no good!

Fortunately I'm self aware and reflexive enough to recognise this and talk myself down from them whenever they start swirling around. I know that these feelings are PURELY a product of my last few years worth of having my mind messed with and my heart repeatedly shucked aside or squashed altogether, and that these feelings, really have very little to do with this situation with this boy himself. I've not started "freaking out", "coming unglued" or allowing them to fly "out of control". I'm simply becoming pre-emptively guarded and defensive, waiting for the inevitable mindfuck, which is totally unfair of me.

Thankfully, I know that, and so I can counter this in my head with rationality, and I've even had a few instances of "face your fear" technique and, when I start feeling these feelings, I just opt to be brave and put myself out there anyway.... and so far, that tactic seems to have to rendered good results.

But that doesn't stop the feelings from surfacing. They're not constant. They're not overwhelming. They're not out of control. But they are there, from time to time.

I was talking to my friend Matt about this last night, and he said I clearly needed therapy. Now, I'm not averse to therapy- I think therapy can be a very useful tool. But I wonder if it would help me in this specific situation. I posited this to Matt, saying that if I recognize what these feelings are, where they come from, and I know how to handle them and also what to do to face up to them... what will therapy do to help me? He said that therapy would teach me to let them go, so that eventually they wouldn't be there in the first place.

But isn't what I'm doing exactly the way one learns to let them go? By recognising them, facing them, confronting them? Ultimately I'll learn to reverse them, and finally, hopefully they are gone altogether? It's not the third agent that makes the difference, it's the way one handles the feelings he or she is feeling. I mean, it's not as though by simply signing up to a therapist, I'll be miraculously healed and they'll be gone. No, he/she'll teach me how to talk myself down from these feelings, curb my insecurities with rationality by recognising the source and assessing the current situation for what it is, then ultimately confronting the insecurities head on...

Isn't that what I'm doing?
 
 
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cellardoor1116
03 October 2005 @ 06:47 pm
I'm sorry, quick bitch here for a second:

Is it so unreasonable, when you make plans with someone, to expect them NOT to make plans with someone else and not tell you about it? Or is this a cultural thing, because that happens a lot here.

Case study: My friend Aby begged me to slot in some girl time (because she "needed" me) with her to watch Friends, eat junk food and watch Friends. We settled on Monday night (tonight) because I had plans last night and tonight was free for her. She made me promise, and continued to remind me about it through text messages, IM chats, etc. over the course of the next few days. Today, I'd heard not from her, so I called her to nail down a concrete time and see what we were going to do. Now, I'm quite stressed with my workload at the moment, so I was actually not looking forward to taking the time out to vegetate, but I figured a promise is a promise to a friend in need, so that loyalty should take precedence. I mean, a regulated precedence- I had no plans of wasting the night away, but I thought I'd try to work out a way that I could combine this Friends watching/girl chatting with something that would be taking my time and attention anyway (like, say, eating dinner)... then I could go back to studying afterward.

Anyway, so I call her to see what she thought about the whole thing, and she says "Oh, I just had my dinner. And I'm going to go see 'Land of the Dead' at 9 anyway so I guess we won't be meeting up tonight..." WHAT THE FUCK. Now, once again, as for the thing itself, I am a bit stressed so I don't actually mind that we're not meeting up, but in principle, I'm fucking livid. Not only did she make plans over her plans with me, but had I not called HER, she would have simply stood me up. And I'd saved this night for her- I had other options that I turned down (and again, practically, this is probably good as I have to put my nose to the grindstone, but in principle...) And she just doesn't see how that is totally rude. And I KNOW it's only because she and her boyfriend made up last night- apparently I'm just a pillow for when things are going sour in her life, but it's okay to toss me aside when things are fine again.

Now, this is not to say that plans can't be flexible. It's one thing if you have tentative plans (or actually, even concrete ones for that matter) that don't work out for justifiable reasons and you keep each other up to date, so that no one feels like they've been "stood up" or the like. For example, yesterday, Alan, my crush du jour, and I had tentative plans to meet up, but things kept happening throughout the day (from both of our ends) that kept shunting our meeting to the wayside. But we continued to text each other, to keep each other abreast of each other's schedule, and when he finally had to cancel, he made sure to call, apologize, and say let's meet up later this week. See, in THAT case, no harm no foul. Because we kept each other up to date about what was going on and why the plans fell through, I didn't feel bad about it at all. I mean obviously I'd wanted to see him, so it was a bummer, but I totally understood why he couldn't make it and appreciated that he let me know what was going on, so there were no ill feelings, if you get the distinction.

Is it so unreasonable to expect this of people? Am I way out on a limb here? Because please, tell me if I am. I don't know if it will make it annoy me any less when people do this, but still... I will better understand my own minority, at the very least.
 
 
Current Mood: frustratedfrustrated
Current Music: Bach's solo suites for violin, performed by Lara St. John